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Disarming the Dangerous: 
Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence 
MARY D. FAN* 
Mass shootings at Navy Yard, Newtown, Aurora, and elsewhere have jolted 
Congress and the states into considering gun violence prevention. More than 1500 
gun-related bills have been introduced since 2013, after the slaughter in Newtown 
of twenty elementary-school children and six adults. Legislation and debates are 
shaped by the specter of a heavily armed, mentally ill individual hunting in public 
places such as schools, businesses, and workplaces. In the states, the most 
successful type of legislation involves firearms restrictions for the mentally ill. In 
Congress, the legislation that garnered the most debate was a ban on assault 
weapons and large-capacity magazines. While the national attention to firearms 
violence prevention is salutary, for law and policy to tackle the core of the problem 
it is important to address two empirical questions: Who are the dangerous 
individuals committing most firearms homicides, and why do the law’s current 
screens miss them? 
This Article draws on data from the National Violent Death Reporting System to 
answer the crucial foundational questions of who poses a danger and why the 
dangerous slip through existing legal screens. Presenting data on the most 
prevalent place of shooting, the victim-shooter relationship, and the shooter’s prior 
history, this Article shows that prevention of extraordinarily devastating firearms 
violence calls for attention to how the nation addresses “ordinary” violence. By 
ordinary violence, this Article means violence that is often viewed as mundane, 
such as altercations between family members, friends, and intimates in the home. 
Many perpetrators of firearms homicide have a history of such prior events—yet a 
substantially smaller proportion of these violent episodes have been adjudicated, 
thereby slipping through existing screens for firearms restrictions. Based on these 
findings, the Article discusses how executive action steering scene-of-assault 
procedure and discretion in dealing with ordinary violence can improve detection of 
the dangerous regardless of whether proposed firearms restrictions survive the 
gauntlet that besets new gun laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the nation’s nightmares come true, a man with a gun hunts and kills outside 
the home.1 A stranger to many of his victims, he is mentally disturbed.2 Bent on 
mass killing, he has assault weapons and many rounds of ammunition.3 Suicidal as 
well as homicidal, the threat of future penalties is no deterrent because he does not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. E.g., From al-Shabaab to al-Nusra: How Westerners Joining Terror Groups 
Overseas Affect the Homeland: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th 
Cong. 38 (2013) (statement of Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Senior Fellow and Acting Director, 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies) (noting that attackers “need a soft target, such as shopping malls, theaters, concerts, 
sporting events, or transportation systems” and referring to “soft targets, such as the 2011 
parking lot shooting in Tucson, the 2012 Aurora theater incident, and the various school 
shootings from the 1999 Columbine massacre to the 2007 Virginia Tech rampage to last 
year’s tragedy in Sandy Hook”); WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN 
TO PROTECT OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 2–3 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the
_time_full.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE, GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION PLAN] (discussing 
galvanizing incidents involving the schoolhouse shootings in Newtown; the movie theater 
shootings in Aurora, Colorado; the shooting at a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin; and 
the shootings at a Tucson, Arizona grocery store). 
 2. See, e.g., What Should America Do About Gun Violence?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Cruz Statement] (statement of Sen. 
Ted Cruz, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/1-30-13CruzStatement.pdf (discussing Newtown killings and bipartisan 
agreement that the mentally ill should not have guns); Michael S. Schmidt, Gunman Said 
Electronic Brain Attacks Drove Him to Violence, FBI Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013, at 
A17 (discussing mental troubles of shooter who killed twelve and injured three in 
Washington, DC’s Navy Yard); Jonathan Zimmerman, Op-Ed., Stand Up to the Biggest 
Bully in the Room: Mental Illness, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 2013, at 18 
(discussing mental disturbances of schoolhouse shooters). 
 3. See, e.g., What Should America Do About Gun Violence?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Kelly Statement] (statement of 
Capt. Mark E. Kelly, U.S. Navy, Retired, Americans for Responsible Solutions), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1-30-13KellyTestimony.pdf (“Dangerous 
people with weapons specifically designed to inflict maximum lethality upon others have 
turned every corner of our society into places of carnage and gross human loss.”); 159 CONG. 
REC. S288–91 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (discussing use 
of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity ammunition magazines or drums at 
mass shootings at Sandy Hook; Aurora, Colorado; Virginia Tech; and Tucson, Arizona). 
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envision a future.4 In just the brief span of a year, he has struck again and again, 
catapulting the nation into the fractious debate over firearms regulation.5 
The man’s face and crimes shift forms on a rapid reel. Eyes bulging from a 
gaunt young face, he is Adam Lanza massacring twenty-six people—twenty of 
them children—at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut.6 
Smiling in uniform from happier days past, he is Christopher Dorner, who put 
California on high alert after he gunned down a young couple, shot at police 
officers, and vowed to hunt down officers who he believed wronged him.7 Head 
shorn bare, with fixed stare, he is Aaron Alexis, who shot to death twelve people in 
Washington, DC’s Navy Yard, while blocks away legislators prepared to mourn the 
anniversary of the Newtown shootings and stalled firearm regulation legislation.8 
Eyes unfocused, lips pursed, he is John Zawahri, who gunned down his father and 
brother and then students at Santa Monica College, leaving six people dead and 
scores more injured.9 
These are just the shootings that made the national news in the last few months. 
Since the schoolhouse shooting in Newtown in December 2012, there have been at 
least sixteen mass shootings involving four or more fatalities.10 Since 2006, there 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. See, e.g., Karen E. Dill, Richard E. Redding, Peter K. Smith, Ray Surette & Dewey 
G. Cornell, Recurrent Issues in Efforts To Prevent Homicidal Youth Violence in Schools: 
Expert Opinions, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEV., Spring 2011, at 113, 114 (“For those 
youth who have decided to kill themselves as part of their attack, deterrence may seem 
moot.”); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning 
on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 277 (2006) (noting limited possibility of 
deterrence among murder-suicides); see also BRYAN VOSSEKUIL, ROBERT A. FEIN, MARISA 
REDDY, RANDY BORUM & WILLIAM MODZELESKI, THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE 
SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE 11, 21–22 (2004) (noting that seventy-eight percent of schoolhouse 
attackers studied had attempted suicide or had suicidal thoughts before the attack). 
 5. See, e.g., Philip Rucker & Sari Horwitz, Newtown Seen as ‘Tipping Point’ for the 
President, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2012, at A1 (discussing how the massacre of twenty 
schoolchildren in Newtown by a shooter who then committed suicide spurred President Obama 
to advocate for firearms regulation reform); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Gun 
Violence on Jan. 30, 2013 (Transcript), WASH. POST, (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-judiciary-committee-hearing-on-gun-violence
-on-jan-30-2013-transcript/2013/01/30/1f172222-6af5-11e2-af53-7b2b2a7510a8_story.html 
[hereinafter Gun Violence Hearing Transcript] (unofficial transcript of What Should America 
Do About Gun Violence?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013)) 
(discussing buildup of galvanizing firearms mass murders prompting legislative reform). 
 6. James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead, 
Including Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1. 
 7. Tami Abdollah, For 6 Days, Fugitive Former Police Officer Hid Near Command 
Post of Calif. Manhunt, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2013, at A13. 
 8. 159 CONG. REC. S6495–96 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2013) (statement of Sen. Richard 
Blumenthal) (discussing how the mourning of the Newtown anniversary and the demise of 
gun regulation was delayed because of the Senate closure due to the shooting blocks away); 
see also Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, 12 Shot to Death by Lone Gunman at a 
Naval Base, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, at A1 (chronicling shootings). 
 9. Robin Abcarian, Jessica Garrison & Martha Groves, Gunman’s Troubled Past, L.A. 
TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A1. 
 10. Katy Hall, Ethan Fedida & Jan Diehm, There Have Been More Mass Shootings 
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have been at least 180 mass killings involving firearms—the weapon of choice in 
more than seventy-five percent of mass killings, defined as homicides involving 
four or more victims.11 In 2012, the most recent year for which national data is 
available, firearms were involved in sixty-nine percent of all homicides.12 
Many of the mass killings that have rocked the nation in recent years have a 
commonality: they are homicide-suicides.13 Also referred to as dyadic death or 
murder-suicide, homicide-suicides generally involve a two-stage act in which the 
perpetrator kills one or more people and commits suicide shortly thereafter.14 The 
interval between homicide and suicide is often brief—just twenty-four hours or 
less—though some definitions include an interval of up to a week to be more 
complete.15 Homicide-suicides are especially horrifying because they defy the usual 
constraints on carnage, such as self-interest in avoiding detection or heightened 
penalties for wreaking greater harm.16 Salient cases of homicide-suicide are so 
branded into the national memory and discourse that they can be invoked with just 
one or two words, becoming part of our national vocabulary of horror: Columbine, 
Virginia Tech, Navy Yard, Newtown.17  
The recent tragedies at Newtown and Navy Yard sparked efforts to pass new laws 
shaped by the specter of the heavily armed, mentally disturbed mass killer.18 
                                                                                                                 
Since Newtown Than You’ve Heard About, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2013, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/17/mass-shootings-2013_n_3941889.html. 
 11. Paul Overberg, Meghan Hoyer, Mark Hannan, Jodi Upton, Barbie Hansen & Erin 
Durkin, Explore the Data on U.S. Mass Killings Since 2006, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/16/mass-killings-data-map/2820423/. 
 12. Criminal Justice Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Expanded Homicide Data Table 
7: Murder, Types of Weapons Used, UNIFORM CRIME REP.: CRIME IN THE U.S. 2012, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses
-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_7_murder
_types_of_weapons_used_percent_distribution_by_region_2012.xls. 
 13. See, e.g., Petula Dvorak, Will These Deaths Be the Ones To Finally Force a New 
Assault-Weapons Ban?, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2013, at A11 (discussing murder-suicides 
that have galvanized the nation, from Virginia Tech to Newtown to Navy Yard); Andrew 
Solomon, Op-Ed., Anatomy of a Murder-Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2012, at SR1 
(discussing murder-suicides that have horrified the nation, from the Newtown shootings to 
suicide bombers). 
 14. Marieke Liem, Catherine Barber, Nora Markwalder, Martin Killias & Paul 
Nieuwbeerta, Homicide-Suicide and Other Violent Deaths: An International Comparison, 
207 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 70, 70–71 (2011); Peter M. Marzuk, Kenneth Tardiff & Charles S. 
Hirsch, The Epidemiology of Murder-Suicide, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3179, 3179–80 (1992). 
 15. Yekeen A. Aderibigbe, Violence in America: A Survey of Suicide Linked to 
Homicides, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 662, 663 (1997). Compare Craig Campanelli & Thomas 
Gilson, Murder-Suicide in New Hampshire, 1995–2000, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. 
& PATHOLOGY 248, 248–49 (2002) (up to one week), with Donna Cohen, Maria Llorente & 
Carl Eisdorfer, Homicide-Suicide in Older Persons, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 390 (1998) 
(within twenty-four hours). 
 16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 17. September 11—another homicide-suicide—has a similar economy of meaning in 
our national vocabulary. 
 18. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S6496 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2013) (statement of Sen. 
Richard Blumenthal) (arguing for unity to pass new legislation after the Newtown and Navy 
Yard mass shootings and urging, “Let us make a mental health initiative a centerpiece of this 
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Proposed legislation in Congress would ban semiautomatic assault weapons and 
high-capacity ammunition magazines, expand background checks, and raise penalties 
for firearms crimes.19 Among the flurry of proposed state legislation in the year after 
the Newtown killings, the most successful type of firearms restriction involved 
restrictions and monitoring of people with mental and behavioral health issues.20 The 
public also fixated on mental illness: according to a national Gallup poll, eighty 
percent of Americans believed that the failure of the mental health system to identify 
dangerous individuals is a “great deal” or “fair deal” to blame for mass shootings.21 
The reinvigorated attention to firearms violence prevention is salutary and 
important. In guiding both law and executive action, however, two important 
empirical questions need to be addressed: (1) who are the dangerous individuals 
that the law’s current screens miss and (2) why do the screens miss them? This 
Article draws on data from the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) 
to answer the crucial questions of who poses a danger and why the dangerous slip 
through current legal screens. This Article shows that prevention of both 
extraordinary homicidal-suicidal violence and firearms homicides generally calls 
for attention to how the nation addresses “ordinary” violence. By ordinary violence, 
this Article means violence viewed as “normal” or mundane everyday altercations, 
such as domestic disturbances or assaults, especially in the home among family 
members, friends, and intimates.22 
                                                                                                                 
renewal and reinvigoration of our effort to stop gun violence.”); 159 CONG. REC. S288–89 
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (discussing mass shootings at Sandy 
Hook; Aurora, Colorado; Virginia Tech; and Tucson, Arizona prompting legislation and that 
the “common thread running through all of these shootings is that the gunman used a 
semiautomatic assault weapon or large capacity ammunition magazine or drum”). 
 19. E.g., Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013) (expanding 
background check requirement to private sellers); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013, 
S. 179, 113th Cong. (2013) (criminalizing sale of firearms for prohibited purposes); Assault 
Weapons Ban of 2013, H.R. 437, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the importation, sale, 
manufacture, transfer, or possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon or large-capacity 
ammunition-feeding device); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(prohibiting the importation, sale, manufacturing, transfer, or possession of semiautomatic 
assault weapons or large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices); Stop Illegal Trafficking in 
Firearms Act of 2013, S. 54, 113th Cong. (2013) (directly criminalizing straw purchases of 
firearms for prohibited persons or activities); Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, H.R. 137, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (expanding background checks to cover sales by private actors). 
 20. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 8100, 8105 (West 2014) (requiring 
psychotherapists to report credible violent threats and extending the prohibition on firearms 
ownership by persons making such threats to five years); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 330.20, 
380.96 (McKinney 2014) (adding procedures restricting firearms possession by mentally ill 
individuals and the certain criminally convicted individuals); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. § 573.001 (West 2014) (providing for firearms seizures from the mentally ill). For an 
overview of the laws passed in the states since Newtown, see State Gun Laws Enacted in the 
Year Since Newtown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2013/12/10/us/state-gun-laws-enacted-in-the-year-since-newtown.html [hereinafter State 
Gun Laws Report]. 
 21. Poll on Factors To Blame in Mass Shootings, GALLUP (Sept. 17–18, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx#2. 
 22. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-108, at 37–38 (1993) (discussing reluctance to intervene 
in violence within the home); S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 35–46 (1991) (summarizing testimony 
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While the current regulatory focus is on preventing violence from the armed 
deranged stranger hunting in schools, businesses, and on the street, nearly half of 
all incidents of firearms-related homicide take place in the home.23 The majority of 
firearms homicides with known victim-perpetrator circumstances are perpetrated by 
people the victim knew.24 Even when it comes to the seemingly most extreme form 
of extraordinary violence—the homicidal-suicidal—the clearest warning signs 
entail incidents of ordinary violence.25 This Article presents data revealing that a 
substantial proportion of high-risk actors who go on to commit homicide-suicides 
have a history of assaults and domestic disturbances but have never been in court.26 
In contrast, a much smaller proportion of homicidal-suicidal shooters could have 
been caught by focusing on mental-health red flags.27 
Firearms possession laws prevent individuals convicted of crimes of domestic 
violence or placed under court-issued restraining orders from possessing firearms.28 The 
problem is that many perpetrators never come to the attention of a court.29 Based on 
these findings regarding what current legal screens miss, this Article discusses how 
executive action steering law enforcement procedures at the scenes of assaults can help 
prevent seemingly “ordinary” violence from erupting into homicidal violence. 
Passing new firearms laws is excruciatingly hard.30 For example, federal 
firearms regulations stalled amid a fierce hailstorm of opposition by gun 
proponents and the National Rifle Association (NRA) despite public support for 
universal background checks and a sharp spike in support for stricter gun laws after 
Newtown.31 Yet even the NRA is on record arguing that the government should 
                                                                                                                 
on trivialization of violence within the home); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 31–34 (1990) 
(documenting problems with neglect of familial violence); Joanne Belknap, Law 
Enforcement Officers’ Attitudes About the Appropriate Responses to Woman Battering, 4 
INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 47, 47–55 (1995) (finding tendency among law enforcement to 
view claims of battered women as not credible, trivial, and unworthy of police time). For an 
excellent history of normalization of the violence, see, e.g., Reva Siegel, “The Rule of 
Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150–205 (1996). 
 23. For the data, see infra Part II.A, Table 2. 
 24. For the data, see infra Part II.A, Table 1 and note 93. 
 25. For a discussion, see infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part II.C and Table 3. 
 27. See infra Part II.C and Table 4. 
 28. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (8)–(9) (2012) (forbidding firearms possession by felons, 
persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, or persons subject to restraining 
orders for harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child of an intimate 
partner or other conduct putting the intimate partner in “reasonable fear of bodily injury”). 
 29. See infra Part II.C and Table 3. 
 30. For an account of the pitched warfare over attempts to regulate firearms, see, e.g., 
Philip J. Cook, The Great American Gun War: Notes from Four Decades in the Trenches, 42 
CRIME & JUST. 19, 27–28 (2013). For a history, see, e.g., ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE 
BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 253–58 (2011). 
 31. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S7987 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2013) (statement of Sen. Chris 
Murphy) (noting that for “6 months since the failure of our commonsense anti-gun violence 
bill this spring” he has brought to the Senate floor a chart showing more deaths in hopes of 
restarting debates); 159 CONG. REC. S291 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (“Do we let the gun industry take over and dictate policy to this country?”); 
Robert Draper, Inside the Power of the N.R.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 12, 2013, at 48 
(discussing the NRA’s role in blocking firearms legislation despite national momentum after 
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focus on enforcing existing laws to disarm the dangerous, albeit focusing on the 
mentally ill or violent criminals.32 This Article presents data regarding how to 
define and screen for the dangerous and discusses how executive action regarding 
scene of assault procedure can improve firearms violence prevention regardless of 
whether new laws are added to the books. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the recent spate of gun 
legislation and debates focused on extraordinary violence by a heavily armed, 
mentally ill stranger hunting in public as the paradigm of danger. Part II presents 
data from the NVDRS on perpetrator-victim relationship, place of death, and 
perpetrator history in firearms homicides. 
Countering the focus on the unhinged outsider, Part II shows that the main risk 
factors and patterns of firearms homicides involve violence within the home by 
people known to the slain. This Part also presents data showing that even in the 
context of extraordinary violence by the homicidal-suicidal, the major early red 
flags and risk factors involve seemingly ordinary smaller-scale assaults and 
domestic disturbances. Perpetrators are very likely to have committed interpersonal 
violence in the month before the homicide—yet never entered the legal system, 
thereby evading current firearms-restrictions screens triggered by adjudications.33 
Part III concludes by discussing how police practices in responding to seemingly 
mundane ordinary violence can improve the law’s ability to identify and disarm the 
potentially dangerous. This Part proposes a remedy that can be pursued as a matter 
of executive action regardless of whether proposed new legislation falters in the 
gauntlet of hurdles that beset attempts at firearms regulation. 
I. THE HEAVILY ARMED, MENTALLY ILL PARADIGM 
OF DANGER IN GUN LEGISLATION 
The recent spate of proposals to reform firearms regulation are shaped by fears 
of a mentally disturbed individual targeting public places such as schools, parking 
lots, and workplaces.34 For legislators supporting more rigorous firearms 
                                                                                                                 
the Newtown and Navy Yard mass shootings); see also Americans Wanted Gun Background 
Checks To Pass Senate, GALLUP (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162083
/americans-wanted-gun-background-checks-pass-senate.aspx (showing that sixty-five 
percent of Americans polled supported the universal background checks measure that did not 
pass in the Senate); Poll on Public Opinion Regarding Strictness of Gun Laws, GALLUP 
(Dec. 19–22, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx#1 (finding a sharp, albeit 
ultimately temporary, spike in support for strict gun laws after the Newtown killings). 
 32. David Sherfinski, NRA Chief LaPierre: Enforce Existing Gun Laws, WASH. TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 2012, at A1. 
 33. See infra Part II.C, Tables 3–5, and discussion at notes 131–135. 
 34. See, e.g., 159 Cong. Rec. S288–91 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (invoking memory of mass shootings at Sandy Hook; Aurora, Colorado; Virginia Tech; 
and Tucson, Arizona in presenting assault-weapons ban bill in the Senate); Gun Violence Hearing 
Transcript, supra note 5 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (opening discussion of gun trafficking, 
background checks, and assault-weapons ban bills by invoking the mass shootings at Newtown, 
Aurora, Oak Creek, and Tucson and explaining the legislation is aimed at keeping “guns out of 
the hands of those who will use them to commit mass murder”); Cruz Statement, supra note 2, at 
1, 5 (inaugurating firearms legislation debates by invoking the memory of Newtown and 
discussing bipartisan agreement that the mentally disordered should not have guns). 
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regulation, the national shock over the Newtown mass shooting seemed like it 
might be a tipping point.35 Shortly after school started at Sandy Hook Elementary 
School on December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza shot his way into the school through 
the plate glass panel next to the school’s locked front doors.36 Lanza, age twenty, 
“was undoubtedly afflicted with mental health problems,” according to the people 
who knew him. 37 That morning, Lanza had executed his mother with four shots to 
the head before proceeding to the elementary school.38 He was heavily armed with 
a Bushmaster rifle, Glock 20 10-mm pistol, Sig Sauer 9-mm pistol, and many 
rounds of ammunition.39 In just about eleven minutes, Lanza murdered twenty 
children and six adults, including the principal, a school psychologist, and multiple 
school teachers and behavioral therapists.40 He then shot and killed himself. 41 
The nation watched in horror as sobbing children evacuated, wounded people 
and dead bodies emerged from the school, and frantic parents and teachers waited 
in the parking lot.42 Inside the school, children were bleeding to death amid the 
bodies of their already-dead classmates.43 Trying to escape impending death, 
teachers had barricaded their students in their classrooms.44 There were scenes of 
futile heroism in the tableau of fallen bodies, such as when a fifty-two-year-old 
staff member tried to shield a student from gunfire with her body.45 Both died.46 
Responding to a national outcry over the violence, President Obama released a 
plan to reduce gun violence through a package of new laws introduced in 2013.47 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Rucker & Horwitz, supra note 5. 
 36. STATE OF CONN., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE STATE’S ATTORNEY FOR 
THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY ON THE SHOOTINGS AT SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
AND 36 YOGANANDA STREET, NEWTOWN, CONNECTICUT ON DECEMBER 14, 2012, at 5, 9 (2013) 
[hereinafter CONNECTICUT STATE’S ATTORNEY’S FINDINGS ON SANDY HOOK SHOOTING]. 
 37. Id. at 29. 
 38. Id. at 2, 27. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Id. at 5, 9–10. 
 41. Id. at 5. 
 42. See, e.g., James Barron, Pupils Were All Shot Multiple Times with a Semiautomatic, 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at A1. 
 43. Ray Rivera, Reliving Horror and Faint Hope at Massacre Site, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 
2013, at A1. 
 44. Kenneth Garger & Laura Italiano, Time Has Not Healed Newtown’s Wounds, N.Y. 
POST, Dec. 13, 2013, at A1. 
 45. CONNECTICUT STATE’S ATTORNEY’S FINDINGS ON SANDY HOOK SHOOTING, supra 
note 36, at 10. 
 46. Id. 
 47. WHITE HOUSE, GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 1; see also Fix Gun 
Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013) (expanding background checks requirement 
to private sellers); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013, S. 179, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(criminalizing sale of firearms for prohibited purposes); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, H.R. 
437, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the importation, sale, manufacture, transfer, or 
possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon or large-capacity ammunition-feeding 
device); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the 
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or large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices); Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act of 
2013, S. 54, 113th Cong. (2013) (directly criminalizing straw purchases of firearms for 
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The President’s three-pronged approach would (1) expand and improve background 
checks of gun purchasers, (2) ban military-style assault weapons and high-capacity 
ammunition magazines, and (3) heighten penalties for illegal firearms trafficking 
while directly criminalizing the use of “straw purchasers” to buy guns for 
prohibited persons or purposes.48 In addition, the President announced twenty-three 
executive actions to improve enforcement and data sharing regarding mental-health 
issues and other matters.49 The President also directed the Attorney General “to 
review the laws governing who is prohibited from having guns and make 
legislative and executive recommendations to ensure dangerous people aren’t 
slipping through the cracks.”50 
By presidential memorandum, Obama also lifted the freeze on funding for gun 
violence research that had impoverished the gun debate of data.51 The freeze had 
been in place since 1996, when Congress eliminated gun-violence research funds 
from the budget of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
added a rider that “none of the funds made available for injury prevention and 
control at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may be used to advocate 
or promote gun control.”52 While the scope of the congressional limitation was 
unclear, funding for gun violence research was effectively eliminated because 
funding officials would not risk losing their jobs or budgets by testing the freeze’s 
limits.53 President Obama’s presidential memorandum directed the CDC to fund 
gun violence research, thereby removing some of the risk and doubt while 
providing cover to open up funding.54 
Change by executive action is swifter and surer than change by seeking new 
laws—especially in the firearms context.55 Firearms regulation is a perilous area for 
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56 (2014); Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully 
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legislators to venture into because of deep cultural conflicts over the scope and 
meaning of the right to bear arms.56 A gun is a powerful shape-shifting metaphor in 
the patchwork of American cultures—a symbol of self-defense, self-sufficiency, 
empowerment, and virility as well as an implement of mass violence, death, mortal 
threat, and danger.57 Whether firearms regulation prevents violence or hinders 
people in self-protection is also fiercely debated on the rhetorical, anecdotal, and 
sometimes (despite the deprivation of research funding) empirical level.58 
The scope of permissible regulation in light of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee of the right to bear arms is also contested and was narrowed after the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in McDonald v. City of Chicago and District of 
Columbia v. Heller.59 Addressing the more extreme pole of firearms restrictions, 
McDonald and Heller invalidated near-absolute bans on handgun possession.60 As 
with other constitutional rights, however, the Second Amendment is not absolute.61 
The Court emphasized that the decisions did not put in doubt “longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”62 
Because gun-control opponents tend to be rugged individualists who value 
self-sufficiency and oppose government interference, attempts to enact federal 
firearms restrictions are particularly fractious.63 An example comes from one of the 
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 60. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3048 (holding that the City of Chicago’s ordinances 
effectively banning firearms possession by most private citizens within the city violates the 
Second Amendment); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (holding that DC’s ban on firearms possession 
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 61. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 62. Id. at 626–27; accord McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion). 
 63. Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 WASH. 
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last major federal firearms restrictions enacted, the aging 1993 Brady Bill.64 The 
Brady Bill required background checks on gun purchasers from commercial sellers, 
who must be federally licensed.65 The NRA and other gun-control opponents 
waged a fierce campaign to punish legislators who voted in favor of the Brady Bill, 
ultimately shifting the balance of power in Congress from Democratic control to 
Republican control.66 Because of such intense political difficulties, much of the 
action in experimenting with firearms restrictions in recent years has been 
piecemeal at the state level, despite the need for data sharing and uniformity to 
improve screens for the dangerous.67 
After Newtown, however, numerous firearms bills implementing the President’s 
three-pronged plan were introduced in Congress.68 One form of legislation 
introduced would extend the Brady Bill’s background check requirement to gun 
shows and private, as well as commercial, gun sellers, thus closing a major gap in 
screening purchasers.69 Another form of legislation heightened penalties for using 
“straw purchasers” to illegally buy firearms for prohibited persons, such as felons, 
or for prohibited purposes, such as to commit drug-trafficking crimes.70 The 
legislation that sparked the most debate was an attempt to ban the sale, 
manufacturing, and importation of military-style assault weapons and large-capacity 
ammunition magazines, with exceptions for weapons used by military or law 
enforcement officials.71 An earlier law, enacted around the time of the Brady Bill, had 
imposed a partial assault-weapons ban, but the law sunset without renewal in 2004.72 
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 71. Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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The bill’s cosponsor, Senator Levin, spoke about shootings in malls, movie 
theaters, and schools, urging, “We must not wait for the next madman to easily and 
legally purchase a military-style assault weapon and a high capacity magazine.”73 
Introducing the assault-weapons bill on the Senate floor, Senator Feinstein invoked 
the memory of the mass shootings in schools and movie theaters, stating, “Let me 
say it as plainly as I can: weapons of war do not belong on our streets, in our 
schools, in our malls, in our theaters, or in our workplaces. We know the common 
denominator in these deadly massacres and these daily shootings: easy access to 
killing machines designed for the battlefield.”74 
Speaking for opponents, Senator Ted Cruz rebutted that the assault weapons 
legislation merely banned “scary-looking guns” and was “ineffective show 
legislation—sound and fury, signifying nothing.”75 Senator Cruz stated that the 
focus should be on enforcing existing laws to keep guns out of the hands of the 
dangerous—violent criminals and individuals with dangerous mental illnesses.76 
Similarly, another opponent of the proposed firearms restrictions, Representative 
Mike Rogers, argued the better discussion should be “[h]ow do we target people 
with mental illness who use firearms?”77 
Despite the deep fracture over whether new gun restriction laws are needed, 
what is striking is the common paradigm of danger in the debates—a heavily 
armed, mentally ill individual stalking public places. When evaluating risks and 
danger, people tend to focus on emotion-laden salient events.78 By focusing on the 
salient rather than prevalent risks, regulatory strategies become framed for the 
high-horror event rather than harms that are more likely to occur.79 This tendency 
to focus on salience rather than prevalence is a particular challenge when it comes 
to firearms-violence prevention law and policy efforts because reform efforts are 
often jolted into action by gripping horror stories.80 The deep divide over firearms 
regulation intensifies this effect, driving reformers to use emotionally resonant 
imagery to try to build a coalition for reform.81 
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This focus on the salient rather than prevalent source of danger may lead to 
blind spots and missed opportunities for more achievable firearms-violence 
prevention. Addressing blind spots, the next Part presents data on risk factors for 
firearms violence in general and for the extraordinary violence of 
homicide-suicides. Understanding the risk factors can also help identify dangers 
that current and proposed regulations miss. The next Parts show, that potentially 
dangerous actors slip through legal screens because a substantial amount of 
violence that would trigger restrictions if adjudicated never makes it into the legal 
system. 
II. TO PREVENT EXTRAORDINARY VIOLENCE, FOCUS ON “ORDINARY” VIOLENCE 
To effectively address firearms violence, it is important to understand 
perpetration patterns and risk factors. Until the establishment of the National 
Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) in 2003, an accurate national picture of 
the context of firearms violence was difficult to attain because the nation lacked a 
national violent-death surveillance system.82 In public-health parlance, 
“surveillance” means systematic aggregation and dissemination of timely data to 
people charged with protecting the nation’s health and safety.83 While the NVDRS 
is not yet nationally representative, its approach of mining official reports from 
contributing states is still a major advance.84 Recognizing the need for data-guided 
violence-prevention efforts, the NVDRS compiles information from death 
certificates, medical examiner or coroner records, law-enforcement records, and 
crime-laboratory records in participating states.85 The most recent publicly 
available data is from 2011and includes data from seventeen states.86 
The collection of data permits a closer look at the circumstances surrounding 
violent death, such as place of death and perpetrator-victim relationship. This 
enables the identification of risk factors to improve the aim and focus of law and 
policy crafted in hopes of preventing firearms violence. NVDRS data can also be 
supplemented with information from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and 
the CDC’s Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System 
(WISQARS).87 FBI data comes from more than 18,000 law-enforcement agencies 
voluntarily participating in the crime-reporting program.88 WISQARS fatal-injury 
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data comes from death certificates reported to the National Vital Statistics 
System.89 WISQARS nonfatal-injury data comes from reports by U.S. hospitals and 
emergency departments submitted to the National Electronic Injury Surveillance 
System.90 Both data sources have the advantage of national coverage but the 
disadvantage of less finely grained detail than data offered through the NVDRS. 
The richest nationally based source of data is from the FBI’s National 
Incident-Based Reporting System, which includes information on victim-offender 
relationships and crime locations by crime category, albeit not by weapon type.91 
The Parts below present data from the NVDRS contextualizing firearms violence, 
supplemented with WISQARS and FBI data. 
A. Firearms Violence at Home, Among Family and Friends 
While recent firearms-restrictions legislation and debates have focused on 
violence from deranged strangers hunting in public, NVDRS data reveals that 
firearms homicides tend to take place at home, among friends and family. Table 1 
presents data on the victim-perpetrator relationship in firearms homicides from 
2011, the most recently available year, from seventeen NVDRS states.92 The 
victim-perpetrator relationship data was derived from examining all cases with 
known circumstances of homicide by each perpetrator relationship type, and in 
combination. 
Table 1. Victim-perpetrator relationship, firearms homicides, seventeen NVDRS states, 2011 
 Count Percent (%)* 
Family or intimates 406 21 
Intimate of relative 13 0.6 
Friends or acquaintances 331 17 
Strangers, gang members 191 10 
Other relationships 255 13 
Shot by law enforcement 34 2 
Relationship unknown 714 37 
Total 1944 100 
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*Victim-perpetrator relationship classification is available for 1944 of 2975 homicides by 
firearms in the seventeen NVDRS states with data publicly accessible in 2011. The 
denominator for the proportion is the 1944 deaths for which classification is available. 
As summarized in Table 1, killings by family, intimates, friends, or 
acquaintances accounted for at least 38% of all the firearms homicides in the 
seventeen NVDRS states for which victim-perpetrator relationship was categorized. 
This number likely underreports the proportion of firearms homicides by family, 
intimates, friends, or acquaintances because it does not include the 37% of cases 
where the relationship is categorized as unknown. Relationships are listed as 
unknown if the suspected perpetrator relationship has not been listed in reports. 
Such missing data is likely due to either differences in data-reporting practices or 
pending investigations. If cases where the relationship is unknown are excluded 
from the denominator, the proportion of firearms homicides by family, intimates, 
friends, or acquaintances rises to 61% of all the homicides by firearm for which 
victim-perpetrator relationship is categorized.93 
Table 2 presents data on the place of firearms homicide by all relationship types 
based on NVDRS data. As summarized below, nearly half of all firearms-related 
homicides in the seventeen NVDRS states occurred in the home. 
Table 2. Place of firearms homicides, seventeen NVDRS states, 2011 
 Count Percent (%) 
Home* 1429 48 
Highway, street, road 754 25 
Other transportation† 302 10 
Recreational area 32 1 
Commercial area 217 7 
Natural area 52 2 
Other‡ 91 3 
Unknown 95 3 
Total 2975§ 100 
*Includes house or apartment and the curtilage (driveway, porch, or yard) as well the interior 
of the home 
†Includes the interior of motor vehicles 
‡Other specified places, including schools, sports fields, or athletics arenas 
§The total equals 2975 rather than 2972 because it includes the numbers of deaths in 
residential institutions, including a shelter or prison, which are suppressed in NVDRS line-
item reporting because they are fewer than ten. 
Indeed, the adage “[h]ome is [w]here the [v]iolence [i]s”94 proves to be true 
among violent-crime cases generally. National FBI data shows that 63% of all 
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crimes against persons in 2012, including assaults, homicides, abductions, and sex 
offenses, occurred in a home or residence.95 Among assaults, 62% occurred in a 
home or residence.96 Among homicides, 55% occurred in a home or residence.97 
Nationally, between 2008 and 2012, firearms were used in about 68% of all 
homicides.98 While much debate has centered on military-style assault weapons, the 
main type of firearm used in homicide between 2008 and 2012 was the less lurid 
but nonetheless deadly handgun.99 Among firearms homicides, 71% of the killings 
were committed using a handgun.100 In 2012, the most frequently recorded known 
circumstance involved in a homicide by firearm was an argument.101 
The data and discussion presented thus far has focused on firearms-related 
violence generally. As discussed in Part I, a motivating concern in the recent spate 
of firearms legislation has been a particular form of extraordinary firearms 
violence—mass killings, often by a homicidal-suicidal perpetrator.102 The NVDRS 
provides an even closer look at the risk factors for homicide-suicides, one form of 
extraordinary violence, because data on the history of persons who commit suicide 
are also collected. The next Parts present data showing that even when it comes to 
the extraordinary violence of homicide-suicides, the risk factors and prior history of 
perpetrators involve seemingly mundane “ordinary” violence and disputes. Many 
of these altercations never make it into the criminal-justice system, thus evading 
existing screens for removing firearms from people convicted of certain offenses. 
B. Rare but Devastating Harm: Homicide-Suicide 
Newtown, Navy Yard, Virginia Tech, Santa Monica College—these site names 
that turned into shorthand for mass killings share a commonality. All of these mass 
shootings and many other mass killings that have shocked the nation into concern 
over firearms violence prevention involve homicide-suicides.103 Homicide-suicides 
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strike particular fear because criminal law’s traditional artillery for deterring crime, 
such as higher penalties for causing more harm, are immaterial to someone who 
plans on dying after killing others.104 Perpetrators who kill multiple people rather 
than one expose themselves to heavier penalties, including the death penalty, in 
many jurisdictions.105 But someone who thinks he will die tomorrow only goes out 
in a greater blaze of fame and glory—a motivation among many rampage 
shooters—if more people are killed.106 
Despite salient events that may lead to overestimation of probability, 
homicide-suicide rates have been low and generally stable over time.107 Estimates 
of homicide-suicide prevalence in the United States vary, ranging from 0.2 per 
100,000 up to 0.5 per 100,000 of the population.108 In the United States, 
homicide-suicides constitute about 5–6% of homicides.109 Homicide-suicides claim 
an estimated 1000 to 1500 American lives per year, averaging about twenty to 
thirty violent deaths per week.110 The homicide-suicide mortality figure is similar to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. See, e.g., Dill et al., supra note 4, at 114 (“For those youth who have decided to kill 
themselves as part of their attack, deterrence may seem moot.”); Fagan, supra note 4, at 277 
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 106. See, e.g., Roger W. Byard, Murder-Suicide, 3 FORENSIC PATHOLOGY REV. 337, 343 
(2005) (discussing “blaze-of-glory” as a type of motivation among murder-suicides); Adam 
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16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 98, 99, 105 (2011) (discussing fame and glory as a 
motivation among many rampage shooters). 
 107. Scott Eliason, Murder-Suicide: A Review of the Recent Literature, 37 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 371, 371–73 (2009). 
 108. E.g., R. M. Bossarte, T. R. Simon & L. Barker, Characteristics of Homicide 
Followed by Suicide Incidents in Multiple States, 2003–04, 12 INJURY PREVENTION ii33, ii33, 
ii35 (2006) (noting prevalence estimates of between 0.2 and 0.38 per 100,000 persons 
annually and reporting homicide rate due to homicide-suicide of 0.238 per 100,000 persons 
in 2004); F. Stephen Bridges & David Lester, Homicide-Suicide in the United States, 1968–
1975, 206 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 185, 185–86 (2011) (noting reports of between 0.2 to 0.38 
per 100,000 persons and finding 0.134 per 100,000 persons per year between 1968 to 1975); 
Julie E. Malphurs & Donna Cohen, A Newspaper Surveillance Study of Homicide-Suicide in 
the United States, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 142, 142–43 (2002) (noting 
reports of between 0.2 to 0.3 per 100,000 persons and up to 0.4 to 0.5 per 100,000 persons). 
 109. Barber et al., supra note 84, at 286. 
 110. Id. at 285; Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–71; J. Logan, Holly A. Hill, Michele Lynberg 
Black, Alex E. Crosby, Debra L. Karch, Jamar D. Barnes & Keri M. Lubell, Characteristics of 
Perpetrators in Homicide-Followed-by-Suicide Incidents: National Violent Death Reporting 
System—17 US States, 2003–2005, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1056, 1056 (2008). 
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the numbers of American lives lost due to afflictions such as tuberculosis, viral 
hepatitis, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, influenza, or meningitis.111 
The incidence rates seem to suggest that homicide-suicide is a relatively rare, 
aberrant event. Yet the impact of homicide-suicides has been devastating for 
communities and individuals with long-term traumatic effects.112 
Homicide-suicides are more likely than general homicides to involve multiple 
victims.113 Firearms are even more likely to be used in homicide-suicides than 
homicides in general—89% compared to 65% according to one estimate.114 The 
United States has higher homicide-suicide rates than peer countries such as 
England and Wales, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.115 This may be due in part to 
the readier availability of firearms in the United States.116 
While research into the treatment of diseases with similar mortality rates as 
homicide-suicides is advanced, homicide-suicide prevention research is in the 
earlier stage of assessing the scope of the problem.117 What is known from 
homicide-suicide research to date is that this extreme form of violence particularly 
impacts women and children.118 In contrast, homicides generally disproportionately 
impact adult men because of the predominance of male-on-male violence resulting 
in homicide.119 The vast majority of homicide-suicides are “family affairs” 
involving killings of family members.120 Studies indicate that 42–69% of homicide-
suicides involve intimate partners, 18–47% involve familicide or filicide, and 12–
26% involve extrafamilial homicide.121 Thus, like firearms violence generally, most 
homicide-suicides are perpetrated by family and intimates. 
Prior studies have found that intimate-partner conflict and domestic-violence 
history are major risk factors for homicide-suicides.122 Several studies indicate that 
the typical perpetrator of homicide-suicide is male, married, and a domestic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Barber et al., supra note 84, at 285; Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–71; Marzuk et 
al., supra note 14, at 3179. 
 112. Barber et al., supra note 84, at 285; Logan et al., supra note 110, at 1056. 
 113. Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–75. 
 114. Bridges & Lester, supra note 108, at 186. 
 115. Id. at 186–87 (nearly double the rate of England and Wales). 
 116. Id. at 188. 
 117. See, e.g., Aderibigbe, supra note 15, at 662–63 (discussing “severely limited” 
research on murder-suicides, in part for lack of a national surveillance system); Liem et al., 
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geographically limited sample sets). 
 118. Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–73; accord Bridges & Lester, supra note 108, at 186. 
 119. See, e.g., Janet L. Lauritsen & Karen Heimer, The Gender Gap in Violent 
Victimization, 1973–2004, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 125, 133 fig.1 (2008) 
(graphing disparity in violence victimization between genders). 
 120. Bridges & Lester, supra note 108, at 186–87. 
 121. Logan et al., supra note 110, at 1056. 
 122. Mary Cooper & Derek Eaves, Suicide Following Homicide in the Family, 11 
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 99 (1996); Jane Koziol-McLain, Daniel Webster, Judith McFarlane, 
Carolyn Rebecca Block, Yvonne Ulrich, Nancy Glass & Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Risk 
Factors for Femicide-Suicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case 
Control Study, 21 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 3 (2006); Logan et al., supra note 110. 
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abuser.123 Even perpetrators of suicide-homicides involving nonpartners frequently 
had a history of intimate-partner conflicts.124 A woman ending a relationship with a 
man may be at heightened risk for being the victim of a homicide-suicide by her 
former partner.125 These findings are consistent with studies finding separation to 
be a risk factor for lethal violence, and a heightened risk of violence among 
separated women.126 Studies have posited that pathological possessiveness and 
proprietariness, particularly over a woman attempting to leave, may give rise to the 
extraordinary violence of homicide-suicide.127 
Existing federal law already prohibits individuals convicted of domestic 
violence or under a restraining order protecting an intimate partner or child from 
possessing firearms.128 The 1996 Lautenberg Amendment added the specific 
prohibition on individuals convicted of a state or federal domestic-violence 
misdemeanor from possessing firearms.129 In addition, many state laws also have 
similar or broader prohibitions on firearms possession by individuals convicted of 
domestic violence offenses or under a permanent restraining order.130 
The nation has democratically agreed that batterers should not be armed because 
of the risk of escalation of violence to homicide. So what is the problem? The next 
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 129. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to 3009-372 (codified at 18 
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 130. For a summary, see Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws 
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Homicide?, 30 EVAL. REV. 313, 317–20 (2006). 
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subpart examines recent NVDRS data regarding the prior history of perpetrators of 
homicide-suicides to assess why high-risk persons may be slipping through the 
system’s screens. 
C. Unadjudicated Assaults: Risk Factors That Current Legal Screens Miss 
To explore risk factors, this Article examines homicide-suicide data from 
NVDRS states between 2005–11. The time period from 2005 onward was chosen 
because the last major survey of NVDRS homicide-suicide data was for the years 
2003–05.131 The number of reporting states with publicly available information 
changed from sixteen to seventeen states between 2005–10 and 2011. For 
consistency of states over time, the data for the sixteen states that reported between 
2005 and 2010 is shown for 2011. Table 3 shows that in these states, between 53% 
and 85% of persons suspected of a recent homicide-suicide had perpetrated 
interpersonal violence in the past month before escalating to their final killing. Yet 
despite high percentages of perpetration of interpersonal violence in the month 
before the homicide-suicide, the rates of criminal legal system contacts are much 
lower, at between 12% and 22%. The data suggests that red-flag violence is 
slipping through the cracks—coming to light too late during police investigations 
or coroner’s inquests into a death that might have been prevented. 
Table 3. Prevalence of interpersonal violence history and legal system contacts among 
homicide-suicide perpetrators, sixteen NVDRS states, 2005–11 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Persons with known 
circumstances 165 142 135 133 157 166 167 
 Past history of violence 
Perpetrated interpersonal 
violence in past month 
140 
(85%) 
110 
(77%) 
104 
(77%) 
88 
(66%) 
93 
(59%) 
99 
(60%) 
89 
(53%) 
 Legal system contacts 
Recent criminal legal 
problem 
30 
(18%) 
31 
(22%) 
26 
(19%) 
16 
(12%) 
35 
(22%) 
34 
(20%) 
29 
(17%) 
Other legal problems 11 
(7%) 
–* –* –* –* –* 12 
(7%) 
*Because the number of deaths was five or fewer, the number was suppressed to retain 
confidentiality. 
†In 2011, the number of states for which data was publicly available changed from sixteen to 
seventeen. For consistency, this table reports data from the sixteen states for which data is 
also available from 2005–10. 
The publicly available NVDRS data for perpetration of interpersonal violence 
does not separately report what percentage was domestic violence. Inferences can 
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be made based on the data regarding the perpetrators’ history of problems prior to 
the killing. Table 4 summarizes perpetrator problem histories. Between 71% and 
81% of homicide-suicide perpetrators during this period had a history of 
intimate-partner problems. In contrast, far fewer had a history of job, financial, 
other relationship, school, or physical health problems. 
Table 4. History of problems by type and percentage among homicide-suicide perpetrators, 
NVDRS states, 2005–11 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011† 
Persons with known 
circumstances 165 142 135 133 157 166 167 
Intimate partner 
problem 
133 
(81%) 
106 
(75%) 
109 
(81%) 
95 
(71%) 
118 
(75%) 
119 
(72%) 
127 
(76%) 
Crisis in two weeks 
before killing 
146 
(88%) 
127 
(89%) 
123 
(91%) 
115 
(86%) 
121 
(77%) 
120 
(72%) 
108 
(65%) 
Other relationship 
problem 
18 
(11%) 
16 
(11%) 
16 
(12%) 
23 
(17%) 
23 
(15%) 
31 
(19%) 
21 
(13%) 
Job problem 10 
(6%) 
–* –* 11 
(8%) 
–* –* 16 
(10%) 
Financial problem 16 
(10%) 
13 
(9%) 
–* –* 18 
(11%) 
12 
(7%) 
15 
(9%) 
School problem 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
–* 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
Physical health 
problem 
18 
(11%) 
8 
(5%) 
–* –* 15 
(10%) 
10 
(6%) 
14 
(8%) 
*Because the number of deaths was five or fewer, the number was suppressed to retain 
confidentiality. 
†In 2011, the number of states for which data was publicly available changed from sixteen to 
seventeen. For consistency, this table reports data from the sixteen states for which data is 
also available from 2005–10. 
As for mental-health issues, strikingly few of the homicide-suicide perpetrators 
had ever been treated for a mental problem or had a current mental health problem. 
Table 5 summarizes known mental-health circumstances of perpetrators. Only a 
small fraction of the perpetrators had ever been treated for mental health illness—
ranging from a yearly count too low to report to a high of just 15% of the homicide-
suicide perpetrators that year. Only a similarly small proportion of perpetrators 
were known to have had a current mental-health problem. If mental-health 
problems were used as the definition of the dangerous, the data indicates the 
criterion would miss the vast majority of perpetrators who escalate to 
homicide-suicide. Of course, mental-health issues may fester unidentified in some 
cases. This low prevalence of a known history of mental-health issues in 
homicide-suicide perpetrators is precisely why mental-health issues are a 
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substantially less suitable screen for the dangerous than the much more prevalent 
known circumstance of perpetration of interpersonal violence.132 
Table 5. Mental health history among homicide-suicide perpetrators, NVDRS states, 2005–
11 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011† 
Persons with known 
circumstances 165 142 135 133 157 166 167 
Current depressed 
mood 
32 
(19%) 
18 
(13%) 
10 
(7%) 
17 
(13%) 
19 
(12%) 
24 
(14%) 
26 
(16%) 
Current mental 
health problem 
26 
(16%) 
–* –* 18 
(14%) 
24 
(15%) 
23 
(14%) 
22 
(13%) 
Current treatment 
for mental illness 
15 
(9%) 
–* –* 13 
(10%) 
15 
(10%) 
21 
(13%) 
13 
(8%) 
Ever treated for 
mental problem 
21 
(13%) 
–* –* 17 
(13%) 
20 
(13%) 
25 
(15%) 
17 
(10%) 
Disclosed intent to 
commit suicide 
28 
(17%) 
14 
(10%) 
–* 13 
(10%) 
19 
(12%) 
19 
(11%) 
28 
(17%) 
History of suicide 
attempts –* –* –* –* –* –* –* 
Alcohol dependence –* –* –* –* 13 
(8%) 
13 
(8%) 
14 
(8%) 
Other substance 
problems 
11 
(7%) 
–* 10 
(7%) 
–* –* 15 
(9%) 
16 
(10%) 
*Because the number of deaths was five or fewer, the number was suppressed to retain 
confidentiality. 
†In 2011, the number of states for which data was publicly available changed from sixteen to 
seventeen, resulting in higher counts. The proportions of the total are still informative. 
In sum, the data on perpetrator history summarized in Tables 3–5 above 
suggests that the perpetration of interpersonal violence and intimate-partner 
relationship problems are major risk factors among homicide-suicide perpetrators. 
As discussed in Part II.B, existing federal and state laws already reflect the 
democratic decision to disarm high-risk perpetrators of intimate-partner violence.133 
As the data on perpetrator history reveals, the problem is that a substantial number 
of perpetrators who committed interpersonal violence in the month before 
escalating to homicide-suicide had apparently not entered into the criminal legal 
system. The prior violence does not come to light until too late, in police 
investigations or coroners’ inquests into a homicide. Without a conviction or at 
least a protection order, potentially dangerous individuals evade legal screens 
meant to disarm the dangerous. 
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III. PREVENTING FIREARMS VIOLENCE THROUGH 
SCENE OF THE ASSAULT PROCEDURE 
This Article’s main aims were to determine the characteristics of potentially 
dangerous individuals who firearms-restrictions laws should be catching and why 
those individuals may be evading current legal screens. The data in Part II showed 
that though the paradigm of danger in current gun-restriction debates is a heavily 
armed, mentally ill stranger hunting in public, most firearms deaths are perpetrated 
at home by people the victim knows. The most prevalent risk factors are 
perpetration of interpersonal violence in the past month and intimate-partner 
relationship problems.134 As Table 3 showed, a major reason why dangerous 
perpetrators evade current legal screens is that cases of interpersonal violence never 
make it into the legal system. This concluding Part proffers a potential way to 
address the problem through executive action rather than entering a bristling 
political minefield to seek new laws. 
The drive for new laws has proved difficult—even perilous. Attempts to pass 
federal legislation have faltered in Congress after fierce campaigns with influential 
interventions by the National Rifle Association (NRA).135 Many state efforts also 
stalled—and backlash led to loosening firearms restrictions in several states.136 
Moreover, the majority of Americans have preferred stricter enforcement of existing 
laws rather than passing new gun laws in every national Gallup poll since the 
question has been posed, beginning in 2000 and continuing until 2013—when 
support for passing new gun laws spiked to a record high of forty-seven percent after 
a spate of mass shootings.137 Thus, this proposal focuses on executive action steering 
enforcement discretion at the scene of an assault rather than enacting more laws. 
Despite revolutionary reforms to try to improve responses to assaults within the 
family in recent decades, many cases never proceed because of underreporting and 
victim reluctance.138 Policies that mandate proceeding even if victims refuse to 
cooperate have proved immensely controversial, beset with allegations of coercing 
victims and exposing them to more violence.139 In many cases, the only chance law 
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enforcement has to intervene in a case of assault by someone familiar to the victim 
is when responding to an emergency call to stop the immediate assault.140 
There is a strong body of scholarship on how to improve procedures for 
disarming batterers after a legal-system intervention, such as the issuance of a 
protective order or criminal conviction.141 But what happens if a perpetrator of 
interpersonal violence never makes it into the legal system, as the data presented in 
Part II revealed is a problem among those who escalate to homicide-suicide? The best 
alternative intervention point is during the police response to the emergency call. 
But what should police do? One idea that some states have explored is to allow 
police to confiscate firearms at the scene of a domestic-violence assault.142 At least 
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(1) probable cause to believe that a crime involving domestic or family violence has 
occurred; (2) a reasonable belief that the firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon: (A) 
exposes the victim to an immediate risk of serious bodily injury; or (B) was an 
instrumentality of the crime involving domestic or family violence; and (3) observed the 
firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon at the scene during the response.”). 
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eighteen states allow police to confiscate firearms at a domestic-violence scene.143 
Several of the laws use mandatory, rather than permissive, language requiring 
police to confiscate firearms.144 The idea seems excellent. Unfortunately, however, 
studies evaluating the impact of such confiscation laws on homicide rates have 
generally found no statistically significant impact.145 Whether this lack of effect is 
due to low enforcement or other reasons is not known.146 
Worse, a leading study found that the existence of a confiscation law is 
associated with higher assault and burglary rates.147 This finding raises the concern 
that the confiscation of weapons at the scene leads batterers to retaliate through 
nonlethal violence.148 The available evidence suggests that, though 
confiscation-at-the-scene laws seem like a compelling approach, such laws may 
bring more pain without reducing firearms homicide rates. 
More promisingly, studies have found that laws disarming batterers under 
restraining orders have a significant impact in reducing intimate-partner 
homicides.149 There is also evidence that obtaining a protection order substantially 
reduces the risk of future violence.150 Obtaining a restraining order and then 
securing weapons removal based on the order has the advantage of interposing a 
legally mandated distance between perpetrator and victim before the weapons are 
removed. This is a safer approach than confiscating weapons at the scene while 
leaving the enraged perpetrator—freshly bereft of expensive property—in 
proximity to the target of violence. 
Because a protective-order proceeding is civil, rather than criminal, there is a 
less-intimidating standard of proof and process, thus exacting less of a toll on 
victims.151 Still, many people experiencing intimate-partner violence do not obtain 
a protective order: surveys have found that only between seventeen percent and 
thirty-four percent of people experiencing intimate-partner violence obtained a 
protective order.152 Many victims of assault who call police to stop the immediate 
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violence do not go on to access social services available to abuse victims.153 
Reasons for not seeking further help and protective orders include fear of retaliation 
for going to court to get a protective order, lack of resources to secure an order, 
mistrust of the justice system, and a misperception regarding the effectiveness of 
protection orders.154 
Among those who do seek a protection order, advice from police about this 
potential avenue of protection played an important role in enabling help seeking.155 
For many people subject to violence within the home, an officer intervening to stop 
the immediate violence during an emergency call may be the only opportunity for 
exposure to outside counsel. Thus, police can play a crucial role in dispensing 
information about protection orders. Systematizing police advice to assault victims 
regarding how to obtain a protection order may bring more potentially dangerous 
individuals to the attention of legal screens for firearms possession. To counteract 
the misimpression that protective orders do not matter, officers can underscore the 
preventive power of such interventions, including the fact that a protective order 
will make it easier to disarm the perpetrator. Of course, such advice would not 
substitute for legal guidance through the process of securing a restraining order 
against an assailant. But police officers can play an important role in informing 
potentially at-risk victims about the availability of protective orders and providing 
information about community resources to help people through the process. 
Federal grants to law enforcement agencies can create incentives to make such 
scene-of-the-assault advice regarding protective orders a uniform practice. Indeed, 
by executive action, President Obama has used the power of the federal purse to 
incentivize state and local law enforcement to take action to improve 
firearms-violence prevention, such as providing information to the federal 
background check system.156 While the national executive cannot commandeer 
state and local officials to do his bidding,157 monetary incentives are frequently 
used to gain voluntary compliance to improve the uniformity of best practices.158 
Federal grants to strengthen local capabilities and enhance training can be used to 
systematize practices regarding identifying and advising victims in need of 
protection orders.159 
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Law enforcement officers are well versed in the scope of their power when it 
comes to investigation, evidence seizure, and preservation and defusing of 
immediate violence.160 Counseling of victims, in contrast, is less of a systematic 
area of emphasis.161 Yet a well-established police role beyond ordinary 
criminal-law enforcement is protecting public safety.162 Training police to inform 
at-risk victims about protection orders and to identify community resources that 
may help victims navigate the process is consistent with the police role of 
protecting public safety. Such an approach can also help close the gap—discussed 
in Part II—between the frequently observed risk factor of perpetration of 
interpersonal violence in the month before the firearms homicide and infrequent 
adjudication, which leads to blind spots in current laws disarming the dangerous. 
CONCLUSION 
After the national shock over mass shootings at Newtown, Navy Yard, Santa 
Monica College, Virginia Tech, and elsewhere, the nation is hungry to prevent 
firearms violence.163 One in five Americans polled by the Kaiser Health Tracking 
Poll reported knowing someone who fell victim to gun violence—often a close 
loved one. 164 Four in ten Americans expressed at least some worry about being 
affected by gun violence personally.165 Since 2013, after the mass slaughter of 
school children and teachers in Newtown, more than 1500 gun bills have been 
introduced in Congress and state legislatures.166 
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The high-horror events that jolted the nation to address firearms violence may 
misguide the focus of attention, however, because of the tendency to focus on the 
salient and overlook the prevalent.167 The paradigm of the dangerous in public 
opinion and legislative proposals is the heavily armed, mentally disordered stranger 
hunting in public.168 Yet as the data presented in Part II showed, there was a low 
prevalence of known mental issues among perpetrators of homicide-suicides. 
Mental-health problems may have been festering but unidentified. This means that 
using mental-health problems as the key criterion for discerning the potentially 
dangerous would miss the majority of those at risk for homicide-suicides. 
Instead, the main risk factors for both firearms homicides generally and 
extraordinary homicidal-suicidal violence feared by the public involve seemingly 
mundane violence at home and among people who know one another. Examining 
the history of perpetrators who escalate to extraordinary violence reveals that early 
warning signs involve interpersonal violence. In many cases, such incidents of 
violence are never addressed in the legal system, thereby evading existing firearms 
restrictions triggered by adjudication. To improve firearms-violence prevention, it 
is crucial to first understand who constitutes the dangerous missed by the law’s 
current screens and why detection is undermined. This Article answered these 
questions using recent National Violent Death Reporting System data. 
It may be tempting to try to address the problem of red-flag violence slipping 
through current firearms-restrictions laws by trying to expand legal restrictions to 
cover unadjudicated violence. However, such an approach of adding new 
firearms-restrictions laws faces major political hurdles.169 A more attainable 
approach is to focus on executive action steering law-enforcement discretion. This 
Article proffers a proposal focused on scene-of-the-assault procedure that can be 
achieved through executive action regardless of whether new laws survive the 
formidable gauntlet for adding new firearms restrictions. 
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